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HOPE AND OPTIMISMBRYANT AND CVENGROS
DISTINGUISHING HOPE AND OPTIMISM: TWO





Structural equation modeling was used to test hypotheses about (a) the dimensionality
of measures of dispositional hope (the Adult Hope Scale, AHS) and dispositional opti-
mism (the Life Orientation Test, LOT), (b) the extent and source of conceptual overlap
and divergence between hope and optimism, and (c) patterns of discriminant validity
for each trait. Separate two-factor models best fit the hope (Agency and Pathways, r =
.68) and optimism (Optimism and Pessimism, r = -.63) data. Analyzing the combined
AHS and LOT data, a measurement model with separate, correlated second-order fac-
tors of Hope and Optimism (r = .80) provided a better fit than did a higher-order model
with a single second-order factor. Optimism correlated equally with both Agency and
Pathways, whereas Pessimism was more strongly correlated with Agency than with
Pathways. Confirming hypotheses, second-order Optimism had a stronger influence
on the use of positive reappraisal as a coping strategy than did second-order Hope,
whereas second-order Hope had a stronger influence on level of general self-efficacy
than did second-order Optimism. We suggest that hope focuses more directly on the
personal attainment of specific goals, whereas optimism focuses more broadly on the
expected quality of future outcomes in general.
A sailor without a destination cannot hope for a favorable wind.
— Leon Tec
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A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity; an optimist sees the
opportunity in every difficulty.
— Sir Winston Churchill
The recent emergence of positive psychology as an integrative research
domain (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) has sparked new interest
in understanding basic domains of positive subjective experience. Over
the years, previous researchers have developed a variety of different
theoretical perspectives on the central concepts that form the bedrock of
positive psychology, including models of self-actualization (Maslow,
1970), hardiness (Kobasa, 1979), subjective well-being (Diener, 1984),
flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), learned optimism (Seligman, 1991), and
hope (Meninger, 1959). Yet there remains little consensus as to what
these core theoretical constructs are, how they should be defined, and
how they relate conceptually to one another. If positive psychology is to
advance, however, its core concepts must be explicated clearly and pre-
cisely, and the conceptual and operational commonalities and
uniquenesses among these key constructs must be clarified.
As a case in point, consider hope and optimism, two central concepts
in positive psychology. How should we best conceptualize these terms?
Are hope and optimism separate constructs, or do they reflect the same
global underlying trait? If hope and optimism are distinct, then how
closely related are they, and in what ways are they similar or different?
The present research addresses these basic questions with three main
goals: (a) to identify the conceptual dimensions underlying hope and
optimism, (b) to determine the degree of conceptual overlap between
hope and optimism, and (c) to evaluate evidence of discriminant valid-
ity for each trait. The present study focused exclusively on dispositional
forms of hope and optimism. We thus defined these two constructs as
personality traits as opposed to cognitive or emotional states. Although
a state measure of hope exists (see Snyder et al., 1996), it reflects a
different form of the target construct from what we are measuring.
In the following sections, we first briefly review past conceptual and
empirical work on optimism and hope, and then use this prior work to
develop research hypotheses about the structure of each concept. We
next consider the relationship between optimism and hope, drawing on
the existing literature to derive hypotheses about ways in which the two
traits are alike and ways in which they are different. Finally, we address
the conceptual issue of discriminant validity—i.e., whether hope and
optimism show a different pattern of relationships with important crite-
rion variables—and we make specific hypotheses about divergent
patterns of association between the two traits.
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THE MEANING AND MEASUREMENT OF
DISPOSITIONAL OPTIMISM
Individual differences in future orientation are a component of many
different theoretical frameworks, including models of depression (Beck,
1967), subjective well-being (Bryant & Veroff, 1984), and generalized
outcome expectancies (Rotter, 1954). Probably the most widely studied
of these future-focused traits is optimism (see Chang, 2001; Gillham,
2000), with the most dominant theoretical perspective arguably being
Scheier and Carver’s (1985) conception of dispositional optimism as
generalized outcome expectancies. Although numerous other models of
optimism have been developed (e.g., Colligan, Offord, Malinchoc,
Schulman, & Seligman, 1994; Dember et al., 1989; Levy, 1985; Malinchoc,
Offord, & Colligan, 1995), we adopted Scheier and Carver’s (1985)
model because it is has the strongest evidence of construct validity and is
the most widely used.
In their original formulation, Scheier and Carver (1985) defined opti-
mism as a stable predisposition to “believe that good rather than bad
things will happen” (p. 219). Thus, dispositional optimism was origi-
nally conceptualized as a unitary trait representing a single bipolar con-
tinuum, with optimism at one end of the spectrum and pessimism at the
other. One way through which optimism is hypothesized to influence
psychological and physical well-being is by predisposing individuals to
engage in positive reinterpretation as a style of coping—i.e., “putting
problems in the best possible light and searching for hidden benefits and
meaning when difficulties arise” (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994, p.
1072).
To assess dispositional optimism, Scheier and Carver (1985) con-
structed the Life Orientation Test (LOT) consisting of four statements
designed to reflect optimism (e.g., “In uncertain times, I usually expect
the best”; “I’m always optimistic about my future”), four statements de-
signed to reflect pessimism (e.g., “If something can go wrong for me, it
will”; “I rarely count on good things happening to me”), and four un-
scored “filler” items, with which respondents indicate their extent of
agreement. A large body of evidence supports the reliability and valid-
ity of the LOT as a measure of dispositional optimism, and links opti-
mism to a variety of psychological and physical outcomes (see Scheier &
Carver, 1992). Although some critics (e.g., Smith, Pope, Rhodewalt, &
Poulton, 1989) have argued that the LOT is better conceptualized as a
measure of neuroticism rather than optimism, more recent evidence
supports the discriminant validity of the LOT as distinct from general
negative affectivity (e.g., Bryant & Baxter, 1997; Mroczek, Spiro, Aldwin,
Ozer, & Bosse, 1993; Scheier et al., 1994). Indeed, the LOT has far more
HOPE AND OPTIMISM 275
evidence supporting its construct validity and cross-sample
generalizability than does any other existing measure of optimism.
Subsequent work has led to the refinement of this instrument. For ex-
ample, Scheier et al., 1994) identified two LOT items that seem explicitly
to reflect positive reinterpretation as a coping strategy (i.e., “I always
look on the bright side of things,” and “I’m a believer in the idea that ‘ev-
ery cloud has a silver lining’”), rather than the expectation of positive
outcomes per se. Including these two problematic items in the LOT
might inflate the apparent relationship between optimism and positive
reinterpretation (Affleck & Tennen, 1996). To remedy this problem,
Scheier et al. (1994) proposed a “minor modification” (p. 1063) of the
LOT, in which these two items and one pessimism item (“Things never
work out the way I want them to”) are omitted, and one optimism item
(“Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad”) is
added, yielding three measures of optimism and three measures of pes-
simism. Supporting the use of this revised instrument (i.e., LOT-R),
Scheier et al. (1994) reported a Cronbach’s α of .78 for the new six-item
total score, with relatively stable test-retest correlations at four months
(.68), one year (.60), and two years (.56). Scheier et al. (1994) further sug-
gested that the original and revised versions of the instrument are essen-
tially comparable, based on high correlations (“in the .90s,” p. 1073)
between total scores on the LOT and LOT-R.
A Bidimensional Model of Optimism. Although Scheier and Carver
(1985) originally conceptualized optimism as a global unidimensional
trait, other work suggests that dispositional optimism consists of two
separate subtraits reflecting positively-framed optimism and nega-
tively-framed pessimism. To explain discrepancies in outcome expec-
tancies within individuals, for example, Dember, Martin, Hummer,
Howe, and Melton (1989) proposed a bidimensional model of optimism,
in which people have both a level of optimism and a level of pessimism.
Within this theoretical perspective, the rejection of pessimism is not the
same as the endorsement of optimism; nor is the rejection of optimism
equivalent to the endorsement of pessimism.
Empirical research supports this two-factor model, though there re-
mains disagreement as to how intercorrelated optimism and pessimism
are. Using confirmatory factor analysis to investigate the responses of
389 college students to the LOT, for example, Chang, D’Zurilla, and
Maydeu-Olivares (1994) found that a model consisting of correlated
(i.e., oblique) dimensions of optimism and pessimism (r = -.54) fit the
data better than did a one-factor “total score” model. Indeed, Scheier
and Carver’s (1985) factor analyses of their own LOT data revealed two
moderately correlated (r = -.64) factors, Optimism and Pessimism,
which together fit their data significantly better than did a one-factor
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model. Affleck and Tennen (1996) also concluded that the LOT taps two
separate factors, but argued that optimism and pessimism are “rela-
tively orthogonal constructs” (p. 909). Research with children (Fischer &
Leitenberg, 1986) and older adults (Mroczek et al., 1993; Robin-
son-Whelen, Kim, MacCallum, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1997) supports a
bidimensional, as opposed to unidimensional, model of dispositional
optimism. There is also evidence to support the discriminant validity of
this bidimensional structure in predicting mood (Marshall, Wortman,
Kusulas, Hervig, & Vickers, 1992) and physical health (Robin-
son-Whelen et al., 1997). In the present study, we tested the hypothesis
that a two-factor model that distinguishes between correlated dimen-
sions of Optimism and Pessimism explains responses to the LOT better
than does a one-factor model, we examined the strength of the relation-
ship between optimism and pessimism, and we evaluated the
discriminant validity of optimism and pessimism factors in predicting
coping and self-efficacy.
THE MEANING AND MEASUREMENT OF DISPOSITIONAL HOPE
Related to the notion of optimism, and sharing some of the same concep-
tual features (see Snyder, Sympson, Michael, & Cheavens, 2001), is the
concept of hope. A handful of theoretical models have stimulated the
bulk of empirical research on hope. However, “the predominant per-
spective on hope in the research literature is Snyder’s cognitive concep-
tualization (e.g., Snyder, Harris, et al., 1991)” (Kwon, 2002, p. 208).
Within this framework, hope is defined as “a cognitive set that is based
on a reciprocally derived sense of successful (a) agency (goal-directed
determination) and (b) pathways (planning of ways to meet goals)”
(Snyder et al., 1991, p. 571). Within this two-factor framework, agency
refers to a sense of efficacy (or “will”) in working toward one’s goals,
and pathways refers to the development of plans (or “ways”) to achieve
desired goals (see also Snyder, 1989, 1994, 1995, 2000, in press).
To assess dispositional hope, Snyder et al. (1991) developed the Adult
Hope Scale (AHS), consisting of four statements designed to reflect
agency (e.g., “I energetically pursue my goals”; “I meet the goals I set for
myself”), four statements designed to reflect pathways (e.g., “I can think
of many ways to get out of a jam”; “There are lots of ways around any
problem”), and four unscored “filler” items, with which respondents in-
dicate their extent of agreement. A growing body of evidence supports
the reliability and validity of the AHS as a measure of dispositional
hope, and connects hope to a host of psychological and physical vari-
ables (see Snyder, in press; Snyder et al., 2001). The AHS has more evi-
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dence supporting its construct and external validity than does any other
measure of dispositional hope.
Empirical research supports Snyder et al.’s (1991) bidimensional model
of hope. Factor analyses of the AHS have revealed two distinct factors re-
flecting agency and pathways that are positively correlated, with the typi-
cal magnitude of correlation being about .40 (Snyder et al., 2001). Consis-
tent with the notion of correlated factors, confirmatory factor analyses
have shown that responses to the AHS are accurately represented in terms
of an overarching higher-order hope construct defined by the agency and
pathways subtraits (Babyak, Snyder, & Yoshinoba, 1993). Thus, research-
ers often use AHS total score as a unitary measure of hope (e.g., Snyder et
al., 1991). In the present study, we tested the hypothesis that a two-factor
model that distinguishes between correlated dimensions of Agency and
Pathways explains responses to the AHS better than does a one-factor
model, we examined the strength of the relationship between agency and
pathways, and we assessed the discriminant validity of agency and path-
ways in predicting coping and self-efficacy.
Another influential perspective on the construct of hope is the theoret-
ical framework of Dufault and Martocchio (1985), as developed by
Herth (1991) in the field of nursing research. Within this theoretical
model, hope is conceptualized as “a multidimensional dynamic life
force characterized by a confident yet uncertain expectation of achieving
a future good which is realistically possible and personally significant”
(Dufault & Martocchio, 1985, p.380). Hope consists of two spheres—gen-
eralized hope, “an intangible umbrella that protects hoping persons by
casting a positive glow on life” (Dufault & Martocchio, 1985, p.380), and
particularized hope, which concerns a specific outcome or hope ob-
ject—which include affective, behavioral, cognitive, affiliative,
temporal, and contextual components.
To operationalize the constructs in Dufault and Martocchio’s (1985)
model, Herth (1991) developed the Herth Hope Scale (HHS), consisting
of 30 statements designed to tap three factors: Temporality and Future
(the perceived likelihood of attaining the desired outcome), Positive
Readiness and Expectancy (feelings of confidence), and Interconnected-
ness (the awareness of interdependence between self and others). Re-
spondents use a 4-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree)
to indicate their extent of agreement with each statement. Despite the
underlying multidimensional model, researchers often treat the HHS as
measuring a single global construct.
The present study examined the psychometric structure and
discriminant validity of the HHS as a measure of dispositional hope. In
particular, we sought to test the hypothesis that the factor reflecting
Temporality and Future would relate most strongly to measures of opti-
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mism, whereas the factor reflecting feelings of self-confidence would re-
late more strongly to generalized self-efficacy. Although there are other
notable models of hope, including those of Hinds (1984), Nowotny
(1989), Post-White et al. (1996), and Staats and Stassen (1985), the con-
ceptual models underlying Snyder et al.’s (1991) and Herth’s (1991) in-
struments arguably have accumulated the most evidence supporting
their construct validity.
DISTINGUISHING OPTIMISM AND HOPE
Comparing optimism and hope serves to highlight key points of theoret-
ical divergence between the two constructs. These sources of conceptual
distinctiveness can provide potentially useful insights into the trajectory
of goal-directed behavior, persistence in the face of adversity, and the
processes underlying adjustment to positive and negative life changes.
A better understanding of the conceptual similarities and dissimilarities
between hope and optimism would also help to improve conceptual
clarity in the field of positive psychology.
Previous researchers have often blurred conceptual distinctions be-
tween optimism and hope. Although separate lines of theory and re-
search have evolved for each construct, the two terms have frequently
been used interchangeably in the literature, with optimists sometimes
considered to be “hopeful” toward the future (e.g., Affleck & Tennen,
1996) and pessimists said to exhibit “hopelessness” (e.g., Beck,
Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974). Yet it remains unclear whether this
mutual substitution of terms reflects their inherent conceptual equiva-
lence or represents a lack of conceptual precision.
Although prior investigators have studied the relationship between
optimism and hope, they have not directly tested competing measure-
ment models for these two concepts in combination. Using exploratory
factor analysis, for example, Magaletta and Oliver (1999) found a factor
solution that distinguished optimism, hope, and self-efficacy, and they
reported that these concepts “were all positively, significantly, and
moderately intercorrelated” (p. 544). However, they did not systemati-
cally compare the goodness-of-fit of alternative factor models that
combine optimism and hope.
Other researchers, in contrast, have used optimism and hope as dual
indicators of a single global dimension reflecting future orientation. For
example, Carvajal, Clair, Nash, and Evans (1998) used three separate
measures as multiple indicators of a latent construct they termed “global
expectancies of the self”: optimism as assessed by the LOT, hope as as-
sessed by the Children’s Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1997), and self-esteem
as assessed by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). They
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reported a correlation of .48 (23% shared variance) between measures of
optimism and hope in a sample of 1,643 adolescents. Although Carvajal
et al. (1998) modeled optimism and hope as both separate factors and
one global personality construct, they reported results only for the latter
model because of their broader interest in predicting substance use. The
present study, in contrast, directly compared the validity and utility of
each of these structural approaches to modeling optimism and hope.
When considered together, are optimism and hope more accurately
conceptualized as one basic trait, or as two separate traits? We ad-
dressed this crucial question by testing three sets of hypotheses concern-
ing: (a) the structure of hope and optimism measures analyzed together;
(b) the strength of relationships between dimensions of hope and di-
mensions of optimism; and (c) divergent patterns of association between
dimensions of hope and optimism in predicting key criterion variables.
The Structure of Hope and Optimism Combined. To assess conceptual
distinctiveness, we compared alternative measurement models for the
hope and optimism data analyzed together. Here we used higher-order
measurement modeling to estimate the relationship between optimism
and hope, in order to determine their degree of conceptual overlap ver-
sus uniqueness. If hope and optimism are truly distinct constructs, then
a measurement model that distinguishes the two traits should fit the
combined data better than a model that assumes the two traits reflect the
same underlying construct. Based on the notion that hope and optimism
are related forms of future orientation (Snyder et al., 2001), we expected
hope and optimism to be moderately to strongly correlated, but not so
highly interrelated as to be indistinguishable.
Tests of Discriminant Validity. We evaluated the discriminant validity
of hope and optimism in two separate sets of analyses. In the initial set,
we examined points of conceptual convergence and divergence between
hope and optimism. Here we tested two alternative conceptualizations
of the relationship between hope and optimism in the form of competing
hypotheses: (a) that optimism relates more strongly to the agency di-
mension than to the pathways dimension of hope, consistent with the
notion that the optimism model rests upon agency-like expectancies re-
garding goal attainment (Snyder et al., 2001); and (b) that optimism re-
lates more strongly to the pathways dimension than to the agency di-
mension of hope (Snyder, 1991), based on the idea that faith in a positive
future leads to greater persistence in seeking possible pathways to goal
attainment, and to more “pathway thinking” (cf. Snyder, in press). Al-
though these competing hypotheses come from the same theoretical per-
spective, a decade of research on hope has led to the general consensus
that optimism has more to do with hope agency than with hope
pathways (see Snyder et al., 2001).
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In the second set of analyses, we tested discriminant validity hypothe-
ses about differences between the two hope factors and between the two
optimism factors in predicting criterion measures.
These discriminant validity analyses were designed to clarify points
of conceptual divergence between hope and optimism. With respect to
optimism, the fact that the original LOT includes items reflecting the ten-
dency to reappraise undesirable outcomes in a positive light under-
scores the presumed connection between generalized outcome expec-
tancies and positive reinterpretation as a coping style. Along these lines,
there is evidence that higher levels of optimism are associated with posi-
tive reappraisal as a means of coping with stress (Carver, Scheier, &
Weintraub, 1989; Curbow, Somerfield, Baker, Wingard, & Legro, 1993;
Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1999; Fontaine, Mastead, & Wagner,
1993). Indeed, Affleck and Tennen (1996) have suggested that optimists’
“hopeful view of the future may well stem from a positive reinterpreta-
tion of the present” (p. 908). Based on the idea that optimists “see the
glass as half full,” we hypothesized that optimism would show a stron-
ger relationship with positive reappraisal coping than would hope. In
addition, we reasoned that the tendency to endorse positively-framed
Optimism would relate more strongly to positive reappraisal than
would the tendency to reject negatively-framed Pessimism.
On the other hand, the conception of hope as the combination of effi-
cacy-based agency and goal-specific pathways sharply contrasts with the
conception of optimism as a global, generalized outcome expectancy.
Whereas hope’s agency component necessarily implies a sense of per-
sonal responsibility for goal attainment, optimism implies no such per-
sonal attribution: “A person may hold favorable expectancies for a num-
ber of reasons—personal ability, because the person is lucky, or because
he is favored by others. The result in any case should be an optimistic out-
look—expectations that good things will happen” (Scheier & Carver,
1985, p. 223). This key conceptual difference suggests that by virtue of its
agency subtrait, hope should be more closely linked than optimism to
general self-efficacy. This reasoning also suggests a final discriminant va-
lidity hypothesis—namely, that the Agency factor will relate more
strongly to general self-efficacy than will the Pathways factor.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE
The sample consisted of 351 undergraduates (265 females, 85 males, and
one who did not indicate gender) from two metropolitan universi-
ties—one public (n = 35), one private (n = 316)—who participated either
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in return for psychology course credit or voluntarily without compensa-
tion. The disproportionate ratio of females to males reflects the gender
compositions of the courses in which these students were enrolled.
Mean age was 19.78 years (SD = 3.34). The sample was primarily Cauca-
sian (70%), with smaller numbers of Asian (13%), Hispanic (7%), and Af-
rican-American (4%) participants. Either individually (21%, n = 75) or in
groups of 5-10 (79%, n = 276), participants anonymously completed a
battery of self-report questionnaires containing the main dependent
measures. The order of questionnaires varied randomly across individ-
uals. Exact sample size varied slightly across analyses due to missing
data for some respondents.
MEASURES
Dispositional Optimism. We used the 12-item Life Orientation Test
(LOT; Scheier & Carver, 1985) to assess dispositional optimism. Respon-
dents indicated their extent of agreement with each LOT item using a
5-point scale (0 = strongly disagree, 1 = disagree, 2 = neutral; 3 = agree; 4
= strongly agree). As noted earlier, a great deal of converging evidence
supports the reliability and validity of the LOT as a measure of
dispositional optimism (see Chang, 2001; Gillham, 2000). Although we
used the original LOT in studying the structure of optimism and its rela-
tions to hope, evidence indicates that LOT scores are highly correlated
with scores on the revised LOT-R (Scheier et al, 1994). When analyzing
the relationship of optimism to positive reappraisal, however, we omit-
ted the LOT items that Scheier et al. (1994) eliminated in creating the
LOT-R, to avoid inflating observed correlations.1
Hope. We used two different instruments to assess dispositional hope.
The first of these was the 12-item Adult Hope Scale (AHS; Snyder et al.,
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1. We had originally intended to administer the items from both the original LOT and
the LOT-R for comparative purposes. However, we inadvertently omitted the additional
optimism item that Scheier et al. (1994) added to the LOT-R (i.e., “Overall, I expect more
good things to happen to me than bad”). Because of this clerical oversight, our revised Op-
timism subscale consisted of only two of the three positively-framed LOT-R items. Previ-
ous researchers (e.g., Affleck & Tennen, 1996) have also used this two-item LOT-R
Optimism subscale, in lieu of the three-item version. To examine the comparability of the
two versions of the LOT-R Optimism subscale, we administered the full LOT-R to a com-
parable sample of 33 undergraduates (25 females, eight males; mean age = 19.85, SD =
1.03), and then correlated the two- and three-item versions of the Optimism subscale. This
correlation was .96, p <.00001, indicating that the two versions of the revised Optimism
subscale share 92% of their variance. Although this evidence does not prove that the two
versions of the revised Optimism subscale are equivalent, it suggests that omitting the one
LOT-R item does not alter the meaning of the Optimism subscale.
1991). Respondents indicated their extent of agreement with each AHS
item using an 8-point scale (1 = definitely false, 8 = definitely true). As
noted earlier, a large body of evidence supports the reliability and valid-
ity of the AHS as a measure of dispositional hope (see Snyder, in press;
Snyder et al., 2001).
The second measure of hope that we used was the 30-item Herth Hope
Scale (HHS; Herth, 1991). Respondents indicated their degree of agree-
ment with each HHS item using a 4-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 =
strongly agree). Herth (1991) reported that HHS total score has a
Cronbach’s α of .94, a two-week test-retest reliability of .91, and
discriminant validity in relation to a measure of pessimism, i.e., Beck et
al.’s (1974) Hopelessness Scale.
Coping Style. We used the 60-item Coping Orientations to Problems
Experienced scale (COPE; Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989) to assess
dispositional coping style. Respondents were asked to “indicate what
you generally do and feel when you experience stressful events” using a
4-point scale (1 = I usually don’t do this at all, 4 = I usually do this a lot).
Although the COPE consists of 15 subscales, we analyzed only the
4-item Positive Reinterpretation subscale, which taps the degree to
which respondents typically reframe the stressor in a positive light. An
example of an item from this Positive Reinterpretation subscale is the
following: “I try to see it in a different light, to make it seem more posi-
tive.” Carver et al. (1989) reported a Cronbach’s α for the Positive Rein-
terpretation subscale of .68, with an 8-week test-retest reliability of .48.
Self-efficacy. We used the 30-item Self-Efficacy Scale (SES; Sherer et al.,
1982) to assess generalized sense of self-efficacy. The SES is intended to
measure generalized expectations of personal mastery and success “de-
pendent on past experiences and on tendencies to attribute success to
skill as opposed to chance” (Sherer et al., 1982, p. 671). Respondents indi-
cated their degree of agreement with SES items using a 5-point scale (1 =
disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly). SES items focus on dispositional
willingness to initiate behavior, willingness to expend effort in complet-
ing the behavior, and persistence in the face of adversity. Although this
instrument contains both general and social subscales, for present pur-
poses we used only the former. An example of an item from the SES is the
following: “When I make plans, I am certain I can make them work.” Fol-
lowing Sherer et al.’s (1982) recommendations, we computed three com-
posite indicators of general self-efficacy for use in our analyses: (a) the
mean of SES items 2, 4, 15, 16, 23, and 27; (b) the mean of reverse-scored
SES items 3, 7, 8, 11, and 12; and (c) the mean of reverse-scored SES items
18, 20, 22, 26, 29, and 30. Sherer et al. (1982) reported a Cronbach’s α of .86
for the full, 17-item general self-efficacy subscale.
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ANALYTIC STRATEGY
The analyses addressed four questions. (1) What is the most appropriate
measurement model for each construct? To address this question, we
used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to compare the goodness-of-fit
of alternative measurement models for the hope and optimism data sep-
arately. (2) How closely related are hope and optimism? To address this
question, we used CFA to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of alternative
measurement models for the hope and optimism data analyzed to-
gether. (3) If the two traits are multidimensional, then are they more
alike in some respects than in others? To address this question, we used
CFA to compare the strength of the relationships among dimensions of
hope and optimism. (4) Is optimism more strongly related to positive re-
appraisal coping, whereas hope is more strongly related to general
self-efficacy? To address this question, we used structural equation
modeling to test a priori hypotheses about divergent patterns of associa-
tion (i.e., discriminant validity) between measures of hope and
optimism and criterion measures of coping style and self-efficacy.
We used LISREL 8 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996) to estimate CFA mea-
surement models and to assess these models’ goodness-of-fit to the data.
CFA enabled us to evaluate and compare alternative models for hope
and optimism, when considering each individually and both together.
Structural equation modeling provided a means of systematically test-
ing hypotheses about the structure of hope and of optimism, about the
strength of their interrelationship, about the higher-order structure
overarching hope and optimism, and about how hope and optimism
differentially predict coping and self-efficacy.
When estimating measurement models, we used four criteria to assess
a model’s goodness-of-fit to the data (cf. Hu & Bentler, 1998). Two of
these criteria represent measures of absolute model fit: the root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990) and the good-
ness-of-fit index (GFI; Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996); and two represent
measures of relative model fit: the comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler,
1990) and the nonnormed fit index (NNFI; Tucker & Lewis, 1973).
RMSEA reflects the size of the residuals that result when using the
model to predict the data, adjusting for model complexity, with smaller
values indicating better fit. According to Browne and Cudeck (1993),
RMSEA <.05 represents “close fit”; RMSEA between .05 and .08 repre-
sents “reasonably close fit”; and RMSEA > .10 represents “an unaccept-
able model.” Analogous to R2 in multiple regression, GFI reflects the
proportion of available variance-covariance information in the data that
the given model explains, with larger GFI values representing better
model fit. CFI and NNFI, in contrast, both indicate how much better the
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given model fits the data relative to a “null” model, which assumes sam-
pling error alone explains the covariation among observed measures
(i.e., that there is no common variance among measured variables).
Bentler and Bonett (1980) have suggested that measurement models
have a GFI, CFI, and NNFI of at least .90.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
OVERVIEW
The analysis unfolded in three stages. In Stage 1, we assessed the fit of
competing measurement models separately for optimism and for hope,
in order to determine the most appropriate model for each construct. In
Stage 2, we assessed the fit of competing measurement models for the
combined hope and optimism data, in order to determine the degree of
conceptual overlap versus uniqueness between hope and optimism. In
Stage 3, we assessed the discriminant validity of dimensions of hope and
optimism in predicting positive reappraisal coping and level of general
self-efficacy.
STAGE 1: DETERMINING THE STRUCTURE OF OPTIMISM AND
HOPE WHEN ANALYZED SEPARATELY
Optimism. We imposed two competing measurement models on the
LOT data: (a) a one-factor model that assumes dispositional optimism is
unidimensional (Scheier & Carver, 1985), and (b) a two-factor model
that assumes dispositional optimism consists of two correlated dimen-
sions, positively-framed Optimism and negatively-framed Pessimism
(Dember et al., 1989). Whereas the one-factor model provided a medio-
cre goodness-of-fit to the LOT data, χ2(20, n = 349) = 162.2, RMSEA =
.164, GFI = .87, CFI = .83, NNFI = .76, the two-factor model fit the data
well, χ2(19, n = 349) = 33.2, RMSEA = .046, GFI = .98, CFI = .98, NNFI =
.98, and was a significant improvement in fit over the one-factor model,
∆χ2(1, n = 349) = 129.0, p = <.00001. These results support the conclusions
of Dember et al. (1989), and suggest that dispositional optimism reflects
two, negatively correlated dimensions (standardized φ = -.63, p =
<.00001) that share about 40% of their variance.
Hope. Turning next to the two Hope instruments, we first considered
the factor structure of Snyder et al.’s Adult Hope Scale (AHS). We evalu-
ated two competing measurement models for the AHS data: (a) a
one-factor model that assumes dispositional hope is unidimensional,
and (b) a two-factor model that assumes dispositional hope consists of
two correlated dimensions reflecting Agency and Pathways (Snyder et
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al., 1991). Whereas the one-factor model provided a mediocre good-
ness-of-fit to the AHS data, χ2(20, n = 349) = 163.5, RMSEA = .162, GFI =
.87, CFI = .84, NNFI = .77, the two-factor model fit the data well, χ2(19, n =
349) = 65.8, RMSEA = .086, GFI = .95, CFI = .95, NNFI = .92, and was a sig-
nificant improvement in fit over the one-factor model, ∆χ2(1, n = 349) =
97.7, p = <.00001. These results support Snyder et al.’s (1991)
bidimensional model, and suggest that Pathways and Agency share
roughly half (46%) of their variance (standardized φ = .68, p = <.00001).
Two additional points are noteworthy regarding this two-factor
model of hope. First, it is an equivalent model to Babyak et al.’s (1993)
second-order CFA model of the AHS, which consists of two first-order
factors with loadings constrained to be equal on a single, global sec-
ond-order factor in order to identify the model (i.e., it generates an iden-
tical implied covariance matrix, and identical parameter indices and
goodness-of-fit indices). Second, unlike Babyak et al. (1993), we find it
unnecessary to add correlated error terms to the model in order to
achieve acceptable fit.
We next examined the factor structure of the Herth Hope Scale (HHS).
We tested two alternative models for the HHS data: (a) a one-factor
model that assumes dispositional hope is unidimensional, and (b) a
three-factor model that assumes dispositional hope consists of three cor-
related dimensions reflecting Temporality and Future, Positive Readi-
ness and Expectancy, and Interconnectedness (Herth, 1991). Both the
one-factor model, χ2(405, n = 344) = 1794.4, RMSEA = .117, GFI = .69, CFI
= .61, NNFI = .58, and the three-factor model, χ2(402, n = 344) = 1738.8,
RMSEA = .114, GFI = .70, CFI = .62, NNFI = .59, provided a poor fit to the
HHS data. Although the three-factor model fits the data better than the
one-factor model, ∆χ2(3, n = 344) = 55.6, p <.00001, both models remain
inadequate. These results fail to confirm both the unidimensional “total
score” model and the tripartite conceptual structure intended to under-
lie the Herth Hope Scale, and they suggest that further work is needed to
develop an acceptable measurement model for the HHS. Because this
was not a goal of the present research, however, we chose not to analyze
the HHS data further, and instead used the AHS as our sole measure of
dispositional hope.
Before abandoning the three-factor model for the Herth Hope Scale,
we examined whether the model’s poor fit was a function of the large
number of observed variables in the measurement model. As Bagozzi
and Heatherton (1994) have noted, measurement models containing
more than about four to six indicators per factor are unlikely to fit the
data satisfactorily. This is because including a larger set of unreliable
measured variables in the measurement model, as opposed to a smaller
subset of more reliable indicators, contributes more measurement error
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to the overall model, thereby reducing the proportion of explained vari-
ance and lowering measures of absolute model fit. For this reason, we
considered the possibility that having ten measured indicators for each
of Herth’s (1991) three factors might predispose the three-factor model
to fit poorly.
Accordingly, we reconfigured Herth’s model into a “partially
disaggregated” form that preserved the full range of “totally
disaggregated” item content, while reducing the number of indicators
per factor (cf. Bagozzi & Edwards, 1998; Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994).
To do this, we converted the ten single-item indicators for each HHS fac-
tor into three composite measures or “item parcels,” using as indicators
the mean of the first three items, the mean of the second three items, and
the mean of the last four items. As with the totally disaggregated data,
both the one-factor model, χ2(27, n = 344) = 198.1, RMSEA = .150, GFI =
.87, CFI = .82, NNFI = .76, and the three-factor model, χ2(24, n = 344) =
191.6, RMSEA = .159, GFI = .87, CFI = .82, NNFI = .73, provided an unsat-
isfactory fit to the partially disaggregated HHS data. Thus, even in a
“partially disaggregated” form, our HHS data do not support Herth’s
(1991) unidimensional or multidimensional measurement models.
STAGE 2: DETERMINING THE STRUCTURE OF OPTIMISM AND
HOPE WHEN ANALYZED TOGETHER
Having confirmed the bidimensionality of optimism and of hope, we
next considered the question of whether hope and optimism are two
separate constructs, or manifestations of the same global underlying
trait. To answer this question, we evaluated the goodness-of-fit of four
alternative measurement models for the LOT (eight items) and AHS
(eight items) data when analyzed together: (a) a one-factor model that
assumes all 16 items reflect a single, global dimension termed Future
Orientation; (b) a four-factor model that assumes four correlated dimen-
sions (Optimism, Pessimism, Agency, and Pathways) underlie re-
sponses to the 16 items; (c) a higher-order model in which a single
second-order factor (Future Orientation) underlies the covariation
among four first-order factors (Optimism, Pessimism, Agency, and
Pathways); and (d) a higher-order model consisting of two, correlated
second-order factors (Optimism and Hope), the first of which underlies
the covariation between the first-order factors of Optimism and Pessi-
mism, and the second of which underlies the covariation between the
first-order factors of Agency and Pathways.
First-order CFA Models. As expected, the one-factor model provided a
poor fit to the combined LOT and AHS data, χ2(104, n = 341) = 629.2,
RMSEA = .140, GFI = .77, CFI = .72, NNFI = .68, whereas the four-factor
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model fit the combined LOT and AHS data well, χ2(98, n = 341) = 191.9,
RMSEA = .053, GFI = .94, CFI = .95, NNFI = .94. Table 1 presents the cor-
relations (i.e., standardized φs) among the two optimism factors (Opti-
mism and Pessimism) and the two hope factors (Agency and Pathways).
Note that the factors tend to be more strongly correlated within each in-
strument than they are across instruments. Whereas the two Optimism
factors share 40% of their variance and the two Hope factors share nearly
half (47%) of their variance, dimensions of hope and optimism have only
one-fifth (Pathways and Pessimism) to one-third (Agency and Pessi-
mism) of their variance in common. Contrary to our hypotheses, the Op-
timism factor correlated equally with both Agency (φ = .52) and Path-
ways (φ = .54), ∆χ2(1, n = 341) = 0.2, p >.65. However, Pessimism
correlated more strongly with Agency (φ = -.60) than with Pathways (φ =
-.45), ∆χ2(1, n = 341) = 6.2, p <.013. These results support the discriminant
validity of the optimism and hope factors, and they suggest that opti-
mism and hope have most in common their respective components of
pessimism and agency.
Higher-order CFA Models. We next evaluated the goodness-of-fit of
two higher-order measurement models for the hope and optimism data
analyzed together. The first higher-order model consists of a single sec-
ond-order factor (Future Orientation) influencing all four first-order fac-
tors. This hierarchical CFA model provided a reasonable fit to the com-
bined LOT and AHS data, χ2(100, n = 341) = 210.2, RMSEA = .057, GFI =
.93, CFI = .94, NNFI = .93. We next examined the goodness-of-fit of an al-
ternative higher-order model consisting of two, correlated second-order
factors—Hope influencing the two first-order AHS factors, and Opti-
mism influencing the two first-order LOT factors. This second hierarchi-
cal CFA model also provided an acceptable fit to the combined LOT and
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TABLE 1. Reliabilities and Intercorrelations for Dimensions of Optimism (Optimism
and Pessimism) and Hope (Pathways and Agency)
Optimism Pessimism Pathways Agency
Optimism .76
Pessimism –.63 .80
Pathways .52 –.45 .76
Agency .54 –.60 .68 .80
Note. N = 341. Tabled on the diagonal are Cronbach’s alphas (i.e., reliability coefficients of internal con-
sistency) for unit–weighted factor scores for each subscale. Tabled below the diagonal are standard-
ized φ coefficients (analogous to Pearson correlation coefficients) from a four–factor confirmatory
factor analysis. These coefficients reflect the degree of association between latent constructs that have
been adjusted for differences in measurement reliability. All φs are statistically significant at p <.00001.
AHS data, χ2(99, n = 341) = 195.4, RMSEA = .054, GFI = .93, CFI = .95,
NNFI = .94. Supporting the notion that hope and optimism represent
two separate constructs, the model with separate second-order factors of
Optimism and Hope provided a better fit to the LOT and AHS data ana-
lyzed together than did the higher-order model with a single second-or-
der factor, ∆χ2(1, n = 341) = 14.8, p <.00012.
How strongly related are hope and optimism? The correlation (stan-
dardized φ) between the two second-order factors in the higher-order
model was .80, p <.00001, indicating that hope and optimism share
roughly two-thirds (64%) of their variance. Thus, when controlling for
measurement error, the two concepts have about twice as much in com-
mon as they have separate from each other. The Pearson correlation be-
tween unit-weighted total scores for the AHS and the LOT was .54 (p
<.00001), representing 29% shared variance. Clearly, unreliability in the
AHS and LOT attenuates the apparent strength of the relationship
between hope and optimism.
How should we interpret these results? Is it more appropriate to con-
ceive of hope and optimism as distinct but related concepts, or is their in-
terrelationship too strong to justify separate constructs? On the one
hand, conceptualizing hope and optimism as reflections of the same
higher-order model is parsimonious, as the two concepts do share a size-
able portion of their variance. Indeed, imposing a single, second-order
latent variable on the two first-order AHS factors and two first-order
LOT factors provided a reasonable goodness-of-fit to the combined
hope and optimism data. On the other hand, compared to assuming only
a single second-order factor, positing two separate second-order factors
of Hope and Optimism fits the data better and explains a greater propor-
tion of variance in the first-order Optimism (.62 vs. .53), Pessimism (.64
vs. .54), Agency (.80 vs. .68), and Pathways (.58 vs. .55) factors. This con-
ceptual quandary makes it all the more crucial to assess the discriminant
validity of hope and optimism (which we address in Stage 3 of the
analyses).
The hierarchical model with two second-order factors also enables us
to determine the degree to which the first-order factors equally define
their respective overarching second-order constructs of hope and opti-
mism. Imposing equality constraints on the absolute value of second-or-
der factor loadings reveals that: (a) Optimism (completely standardized
γ = .79) and Pessimism (γ = -.80) were equally indicative of dispositional
optimism, ∆χ2(1, n = 341) = 1.5, p >.22, and (b) Agency (γ = .76) and Path-
ways (γ = .89) were equally indicative of dispositional hope, ∆χ2(1, n =
341) = 2.8, p >.09. Of additional interest in this higher-order measure-
ment model is the unexplained residual variance in each first-order fac-
tor, after removing the variance it shares with the overarching sec-
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ond-order construct. Imposing equality constraints on residual variance
estimates for first-order factors revealed that the first-order Optimism
and Pessimism factors had equal amounts of specific variance, ∆χ2(1, n =
341) = 0.4, p>.34, as did the first-order Agency and Pathways factors,
∆χ2(1, n = 341) = 1.3, p >.09.
STAGE 3: ASSESSING THE DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY OF
OPTIMISM AND HOPE
In the final stage of the analysis, we used LISREL 8 to test hypotheses
about the pattern of relationships between (a) the personality measures
of hope and optimism and (b) the criterion measures of coping and
self-efficacy. We used structural equation modeling rather than multi-
ple regression because it allowed us to estimate the relationships be-
tween personality traits and criterion variables, partialling out
measurement error in the measured indicators. It also enabled us to use
equality constraints to test hypotheses about the strength of the
relationships among latent variables.
To assess discriminant validity, we imposed two different latent-vari-
able path models on the combined data set, each of which used the hope
and optimism measures to predict the criterion measures. The first was a
hierarchical path model consisting of two, correlated second-order fac-
tors (Hope as defined by the two first-order AHS factors, and Optimism
as defined by the two first-order LOT factors), each influencing the en-
dogenous latent variables of Positive Reappraisal and General Self-Effi-
cacy. This hierarchical path model allowed us to examine the
discriminant validity of the second-order factors of Hope and Optimism
as predictors of coping and self-efficacy. The second latent-variable path
model consisted of four correlated, exogenous latent variables (Opti-
mism, Pessimism, Agency, and Pathways), each influencing the endoge-
nous latent variables of Positive Reappraisal and General Self-Efficacy.
The path model with four exogenous latent variables allowed us to test
discriminant validity within each pair of factors in the bidimensional
models of Hope and Optimism. In both of these structural models, we
omitted from the model the LOT items that Scheier et al. (1994) dropped
in their revised version of the LOT, so as to avoid inflating the apparent
relationship between optimism and positive reappraisal coping.
(Results using the original LOT items were comparable, though of
slightly lower magnitude.)
Having an excessive number of estimated parameters in structural
models reduces statistical power, making it more difficult to detect exist-
ing relationships, and weakening apparent model fit. To reduce the
number of estimated parameters in our structural models, we adopted a
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“partial disaggregation” measurement model (Bagozzi & Edwards,
1998; Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994), in which we minimized the number
of measured variables by parceling them into two indicators for each la-
tent variable. The primary advantages of the “partial disaggregation”
(molecular) approach, relative to a “total disaggregation” individual
item (atomistic) approach, are: (a) it reduces the number of parameters
to be estimated, so that smaller sample sizes are required; and (b) it tends
to decrease measurement errors in indicators by aggregating items to
form more reliable, composite indices, so that models generally fit the
data better (Bagozzi & Edwards, 1998; Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994).
Comparing their totally and partially disaggregated forms, the hierar-
chical path model had 55 versus 33 estimated parameters (a 40% reduc-
tion), and the path model with four exogenous latent variables had 56 es-
timated parameters versus 38 (a 32% reduction). These reductions kept
sample size close to the recommended ratio of 10:1, relative to the
number of estimated model parameters (Kline, 1998).
In these partial disaggregation measurement models, the pairs of indi-
cators for each latent variable were as follows: (a) Optimism (LOT items
1 and 5); (b) Pessimism (the mean of LOT items 3 and 8; and LOT item
12); (c) Pathways (the mean of AHS items 1 and 4; and the mean of AHS
items 6 and 8); (d) Agency (the mean of AHS items 2 and 9; and the mean
of AHS items 10 and 12); (e) Positive Reappraisal (the mean of COPE
items 1 and 29; and the mean of COPE items 38 and 59); and (f) General
Self-Efficacy (the mean of SES items 2, 4, 15, 16, 23, 27 and of re-
verse-scored SES items 3, 7, 8, 11, 12; and the mean of reverse-scored SES
items 18, 20, 22, 26, 29, and 30). Note that we excluded from our
discriminant validity analyses the LOT items that Scheier et al. (1994)
eliminated in creating the LOT-R, so as to avoid inflating the relation-
ship between optimism and positive reappraisal.
Higher-order Model. The hierarchical path model provided an accept-
able fit to the combined data from the LOT, the AHS, and the criterion
measures, χ2(45, n = 347) = 95.2, RMSEA = .058, GFI = .96, CFI = .97, NNFI
= .96, and afforded a direct test of discriminant validity for the sec-
ond-order Hope and Optimism factors. Figure 1 presents a structural di-
agram of this “partial disaggregation” hierarchical model, along with
the completely standardized LISREL estimates of model parameters.
We used equality constraints to test two discriminant validity hypoth-
eses about the strength of the relationships between the second-order
factors of Hope and Optimism and the first-order criterion factors: (a)
optimism is more strongly related to positive reappraisal coping than is
hope; and (b) hope is more strongly related to general self-efficacy than
is optimism. We tested each hypothesis separately by constraining the
influence of the second-order factors on the given criterion measure to











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































be equal, and then contrasting this nested model’s goodness-of-fit with
that of the baseline model containing no equality constraints. The differ-
ence in these two goodness-of-fit chi-square values provides a likeli-
hood-ratio test of the hypothesis that the two second-order factors have
different relationships with the given criterion factor (see Bryant, 2001;
Bryant & Baxter, 1997).
Confirming predictions, second-order Optimism had a stronger influ-
ence on the use of positive reappraisal as a coping strategy than did sec-
ond-order Hope, ∆χ2(1, n = 347) = 4.4, one-tailed p <.018, whereas sec-
ond-order Hope had a stronger influence on level of general self-efficacy
than did second-order Optimism, ∆χ2(1, n = 347) = 4.9, one-tailed p <.014
(see Figure 1). Indeed, controlling for the influence of the other sec-
ond-order trait, Optimism was a statistically significant predictor of
positive reappraisal, standardized γ = .78, one-tailed p <.0016, whereas
Hope was not, standardized γ = -.11, two-tailed p >.62; and Hope was a
statistically significant predictor of general self-efficacy, standardized γ
= .77, one-tailed p <.00004, whereas Optimism was not, standardized γ =
.08, two-tailed p >.64. These results support the discriminant validity of
hope and optimism.
First-order Model. The latent-variable path model using the two
first-order hope factors and the two first-order optimism factors to pre-
dict the two criterion factors also provided an acceptable goodness-of-fit
to the data, χ2(40, n = 347) = 81.2, RMSEA = .053, GFI = .96, CFI = .98,
NNFI = .96. This first-order model enabled us to test discriminant valid-
ity hypotheses about differences between the two hope factors and be-
tween the two optimism factors in predicting criterion measures. Table 2
presents the results for this structural model, in terms of the standard-
ized regression coefficients using optimism, pessimism, pathways, and
agency to predict coping and self-efficacy.
Initial tests of homogeneity in path coefficients (i.e., the absence of
discriminant validity) revealed that the four hope and optimism factors
had different relationships with Positive Reappraisal, ∆χ2(3, n = 347) =
49.9, p <.00002, and with General Self-Efficacy, ∆χ2(3, n = 347) = 112.7, p
<.00001. Confirming our a priori hypotheses, within the Optimism do-
main, Optimism was a stronger predictor of Positive Reappraisal than
was Pessimism, ∆χ2(1, n = 347) = 5.8, one-tailed p <.0082; and within the
Hope domain, Agency was a stronger predictor of General Self-Efficacy
than was Pathways, ∆χ2(1, n = 347) = 7.8, one-tailed p <.0027. Indeed,
multiple regression analyses of mean subscale scores reveals that: (a) en-
tering Agency and Pathways as a set of predictors after first entering Op-
timism and Pessimism significantly improves the variance explained in
both Positive Reinterpretation, ∆R2 = .04, F(2, 344) = 9.3, p <.0002, and
General Self-Efficacy, ∆R2 = .18, F(2, 344) = 60.2, p <.00001; and (b) enter-
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ing Optimism and Pessimism as a set of predictors after first entering
Agency and Pathways significantly improves the variance explained in
both Positive Reinterpretation, ∆R2 = .16, F(2, 344) = 43.3, p <.00001, and
General Self-Efficacy, ∆R2 = .05, F(2, 344) = 18.0, p <.00001. These findings
support the discriminant validity of the bidimensional models of
optimism and hope.
CONCLUSIONS
The present study contributes to the literature on positive psychology by
explicating the relationship between the central personality constructs
of optimism and hope, by highlighting their points of conceptual over-
lap and divergence, and by demonstrating their discriminant validity in
predicting coping and self-efficacy. With respect to dispositional opti-
mism, our results strongly support a two-dimensional conceptualiza-
tion that distinguishes between the rejection of pessimism and the
endorsement of optimism as different forms of generalized future ex-
pectancy. The bidimensionality of optimism suggests that people may
be neither optimistic nor pessimistic (e.g., having no generalized future
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TABLE 2. Standardized Regression Coefficients from Latent Variable Path Model
Using Dimensions of Optimism (Optimism and Pessimism) and Hope (Pathways and
Agency) to Predict Criterion Measures
Criterion Measures
Positive Reappraisal General Self–Efficacy
Dimensions of
Optimism and Hope p p
Optimism .57 .0004 .05 .32
Pessimism .02 .96 –.26 .005
Pathways .07 .26 .05 .30
Agency .10 .18 .56 .0000
R
2 .45 .67
Note. N = 347. Tabled are completely standardized γ (gamma) coefficients (analogous to standardized
betas in multiple regression) from structural equation modeling. These coefficients reflect the degree
of association between latent constructs that have been adjusted for differences in measurement reli-
ability. All p–values are one–tailed, except for that associated with the path coefficient linking pessi-
mism to positive reappraisal coping. Initial tests of homogeneity among path coefficients (i.e., the
absence of discriminant validity) revealed that the four hope and optimism factors had different rela-
tionships with Positive Reappraisal, ∆χ
2
(3, n = 339) = 49.9, p <.00001, and with General Self–Efficacy,
∆χ
2
(3, n = 339) = 112.7, p <.00001. Cronbach’s alphas (i.e., reliability coefficients of internal consistency)
for unit–weighted factor scores on these subscales were: Optimism (.76), Pessimism (.80), Pathways
(.76), and Agency (.80), Positive Reappraisal Coping (.78), and General Self–Efficacy (.80).
expectancies), rather than necessarily being either an optimist or pessi-
mist. As Albert Schweitzer observed, “An optimist is a person who sees
a green light everywhere, while a pessimist sees only the red
stoplight...The truly wise person is colorblind.” However, the tradi-
tional unidimensional model of optimism—which has optimism at one
end of the continuum and pessimism at the other—forces the “truly wise
person” (who rejects both optimism and pessimism) to score at the mid-
point on the single optimism-pessimism continuum. With the
bidimensional model, in contrast, the “truly wise person” can have low
scores on both the optimism and pessimism subscales. Indeed, 5% (n =
16) of our sample scored in the lowest quartile on both the optimism and
pessimism subscales.
The bidimensionality of optimism also suggests that people may be
both optimistic and pessimistic, as when an individual defensively ex-
presses pessimism in public, but is privately optimistic (e.g., Norem &
Cantor, 1986). Whereas the unidimensional model forces the defensive
pessimist to score at the midpoint on the single optimism-pessimism
continuum, the two-factor model permits the defensive pessimist to
have high scores on both the optimism and pessimism subscales. In fact,
9% (n = 31) of our sample scored in the highest quartile on both the
optimism and pessimism subscales.
Although optimism and pessimism overlap roughly 40%, they are
more accurately conceptualized as two separate traits, not as two ends of
the same bipolar continuum. In particular, optimism is a stronger pre-
dictor of positive reinterpretation coping than is pessimism, whereas
pessimism is a stronger predictor of general self-efficacy than is opti-
mism. This evidence strongly supports the discriminant validity of the
distinction between optimism and pessimism. Combining optimism
and pessimism into a total score might obscure findings that would
emerge for one dimension but not the other (Affleck & Tennen, 1996).
The distinction between being optimistic versus not being pessimistic is
consistent with clinical findings concerning the differential effects of
positive versus non-negative thinking on depressive symptomatology
(Hollon & Kendall, 1980).
By the same token, our results concerning hope also demonstrate un-
equivocally that having a generalized sense of agency in relation to the
future is not the same as having a generalized notion of specific path-
ways to the future. The Will and the Ways represent correlated but sepa-
rate aspects of goal-orientation. Indeed, Agency shows a stronger asso-
ciation with general self-efficacy than does Pathways. Hope is more
accurately conceptualized as separate, positively correlated dimensions
of Agency and Pathways, rather than as a unitary construct. Treating
hope as unidimensional merges Agency and Pathways and might well
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produce erroneous conclusions about the antecedents and
consequences of hope.
Our data also suggest that Snyder et al.’s (1991) AHS is a
psychometrically superior measure of dispositional hope compared to
Herth’s (1991) HHS. We were unable to confirm the three-factor mea-
surement model intended to underlie the HHS, nor was a one-factor “to-
tal score” model a reasonable representation of responses to the HHS.
Clearly, further work is needed to refine the set of HHS items, in order to
develop an acceptable measurement model for this instrument. Until
then, researchers who wish to assess dispositional hope would do better
to use the AHS rather than the HHS.
Should researchers conceive of hope and optimism as two separate
constructs or as reflections of the same global underlying trait? Our data
indicate that both conceptualizations have merit. Supporting two dis-
tinct constructs, separate second-order hope and optimism factors have
greater explanatory power than does a single global “super” factor, and
the two constructs show divergent patterns of association with coping
and self-efficacy. Supporting a unitary conceptualization, on the other
hand, second-order hope and optimism share a sizeable portion (64%) of
their variance, and a single global “super” factor provides a reasonable
and parsimonious goodness-of-fit to the data. Perhaps both traits reflect
a general third-order tendency toward constructive future-focused
thinking (Epstein & Meier, 1989). The ultimate choice between distin-
guishing or merging hope and optimism may well depend on whether
the researcher seeks to maximize predictive accuracy or simply to sum-
marize individuals’ future orientation. Our results clearly indicate that
investigators studying the effects of future expectancies on physical and
emotional outcomes would do better to model hope and optimism as
separate but related constructs; however, investigators who wish
merely to assess global future orientation, in contrast, could adopt a
unidimensional second-order model to gain a general summary,
without losing too much information.
An important finding from this research is that hope has more to do
with general self-efficacy than does optimism, whereas optimism has
more to do with positive reappraisal coping than does hope. This differ-
ential pattern of relations would not have emerged, if hope and opti-
mism were one in the same. We suggest that optimism has stronger im-
plications for dispositional cognitive appraisals of personal outcomes,
whereas hope is more strongly tied to dispositional beliefs about
personal capabilities.
One potential conceptual problem concerns our choice of self-efficacy
as a criterion measure for hope. These two constructs may well have a
conceptual overlap similar to that of optimism and hope. Indeed, it
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could be argued that hope, optimism, and self-efficacy all tap a single
overarching factor. If all three concepts are interchangeable, however,
then a one-factor model should provide a reasonable goodness-of-fit
when analyzing the optimism, hope, and self-efficacy data together; and
the fit of this one-factor model should resemble that of a three-factor
model that distinguishes separate, correlated factors of optimism, hope,
and self-efficacy.
However, supplementary analyses of our data reveal that this is not
the case. On the contrary, the one-factor model, χ2(152, n = 339) = 817.82,
RMSEA = .129, GFI = .76, CFI = .74, TLC = .70, fit the combined data sig-
nificantly worse than did the three-factor model, χ2(149, n = 339) =
540.70, RMSEA = .099, GFI = .83, CFI = .84, TLC = .82; ∆χ2(3, n = 339) =
277.12, p <.00001. In addition, both two-factor models that we
tested—Hope with a combined Optimism and Self-Efficacy factor,
χ2(151, n = 339) = 696.67, RMSEA = .117, GFI = .79, CFI = .78, TLC = .76,
and Optimism with a combined Hope and Self-Efficacy factor, χ2(151, n
= 339) = 611.25, RMSEA = .106, GFI = .82, CFI = .82, TLC = .79—fit the
combined data significantly worse than did the three-factor model, ∆χ2s
(2, n = 339) = 155.97 and 70.55, respectively, ps <.00001. Considered to-
gether, these findings suggest that self-efficacy is better conceptualized
as a separate, correlated construct in relation to hope and optimism,
rather than as a conceptually overlapping construct (cf. Magaletta & Oli-
ver, 1999). This supports our use of general self-efficacy as a criterion
measure for hope.
Nevertheless, there is another potential problem with our choice of
general self-efficacy as a criterion for hope. Unlike the criterion for opti-
mism—i.e., positive reappraisal—self-efficacy is not an index of behav-
ior. It would have been more advantageous to select a criterion for hope
that reflects behavior rather than belief, such as behavioral persistence
or problem-solving efforts.
Our results also shed light on ways in which hope and optimism are
similar and ways in which the two traits are different. The subtrait of
dispositional pessimism is more distinct from hope when hope is de-
fined as Pathways (20% shared variance) than when hope is defined as
Agency (36% shared variance). This result is consistent with the notion
that generalized pessimism rests upon agency-like expectancies regard-
ing goal attainment (cf. Snyder et al., 2001). The strong connections often
found among negative thoughts about the future, the self, and world
(e.g., Beck, 1967; Bryant & Baxter, 1997; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) are con-
sistent with the stronger conceptual overlap between Pessimism and
Agency. That the Pathways subtrait is more distinct from Pessimism
confirms the notion that it is possible to know the means through which
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one might attain one’s goals, yet still doubt that one will ever achieve
those goals.
This line of reasoning suggests that hope focuses more directly on ex-
pectations about the personal attainment of specific goals, whereas opti-
mism focuses more broadly on the expected quality of future outcomes
in general. Indeed, Affleck and Tennen (1996) have argued that hope is
specifically “based on the perceived accessibility of desired goals” (p.
911). As Leon Tec aptly noted, “A sailor without a destination cannot
hope for a favorable wind.” A sailor without a destination has no goal,
no hope object in relation to which to perceive agency and pathways. Ex-
tending this metaphor further, our data indicate that a sailor who has a
destination but lacks commitment to the voyage (i.e., who lacks Agency)
would be likely to be pessimistic about reaching that destination;
whereas a committed sailor who has a destination but no ship (i.e., who
lacks Pathways) might still refuse to be pessimistic about the ultimate
likelihood of reaching that destination. Pessimism has more to do with
lack of agency than with lack of pathways.
Several important limitations constrain our research conclusions.
Concerning the issue of construct validity, our criterion measures were
exclusively self-report and did not include behavioral or physiological
indicators, such as task persistence or immunology. Concerning exter-
nal validity issues, our sample was restricted exclusively to college un-
dergraduates, 90% of whom attended a private university where more
than half of students are Catholic. Hope and optimism might well be
more distinct in older groups or among individuals of different religious
backgrounds.
A final point concerns future directions for the conceptualization and
measurement of hope and optimism. In explaining the partial independ-
ence of optimism and pessimism, Marshall et al. (1992) have suggested
that the lack of correspondence between the two may “be due to whether
people have proximal or distal goals in mind. A person might, for exam-
ple, be pessimistic over the short run, but optimistic with respect to
broader or more far-reaching outcomes” (p. 1072). This temporal per-
spective seems equally applicable to the concept of hope, which may
have a different meaning in relation to shorter-term versus longer-term
goals. For example, the Arabic language includes two terms for hope:
“raja ‘a,” which is more formal and refers primarily to expectancies di-
rected in relation to the distant future, and “amal,” which is more infor-
mal and refers to expectancies in relation to the immediate and unfolding
present (Abi-Hashem, 2001). Researchers might well gain deeper in-
sights into the meaning of both hope and optimism by distinguishing
short-term and long-term future expectancies. For example, having re-
spondents complete the LOT and AHS twice, focusing once on proximal
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outcomes and once on distant outcomes, might reveal that responses to
each instrument are more unidimensional within than across the two
time frames.
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